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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the
trial court following a four-day bench trial. This appeal arises out of disputes between a
landowner-Mr. Mark Radford and Radford Cattle LLC (together referred to herein as
"Radford")-and a rancher operating a cattle business on adjacent properties-Mr. Jay Van Orden
and Seven J. Ranches, Inc. ("Seven J."). These disputes resulted in two lawsuits. In the first suit,
Radford sued Mr. Van Orden to recover damages resulting from Mr. Van Orden's trespass on Mr.
Radford's private property. In the second suit, Radford sued Seven J. to require Seven J. to pay its
one-half share of partition fencing pursuant to Idaho Code § 35-103. These lawsuits were
subsequently consolidated. After a four-day bench trial, Judge Darren Simpson issued a
comprehensive fifty-five page findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and awarded Mr. Radford
$72,175.00 for property damages caused by Mr. Van Orden and $5,000 for Seven J.'s one-half
share of partition fencing. The district court subsequently granted Mr. Radford's request for
attorneys' fees and costs against Seven J. pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(1).
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Radford filed a complaint against Mr. Van Orden on October 20, 201 7 in Bingham
County (the "Van Orden Litigation"). R p. 18. Mr. Radford filed the operative Second Amended
Complaint in the Van Orden Litigation on January 8, 2019. R p. 103. The Second Amended
Complaint contained ten separate causes of action against Mr. Van Orden, including trespass and
damages for restoration of property. R pp. 110-19.
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Mr. Radford filed a complaint against Seven J. on August 2, 2018 in Bingham County (the
"Seven J. Litigation"). Aug. p. 73-79; R p. 331, L. 13. This complaint included a single cause of
action-violation ofldaho's fencing statute Idaho Code§ 35-103. Aug. p. 73-79; Rp. 331, L. 13.
On October 15, 2018, the district court consolidated the Van Orden Litigation with the Seven J.
Litigation. R p. 331, L. 14.
The consolidated cases were heard by Judge Darren Simpson during a four-day bench trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, and after each party was permitted to submit closing arguments in
writing, the district court granted Mr. Radford with an award for property damages against Mr.
Van Orden, fencing costs against Seven J., and attorneys' fees and costs against Seven J. R pp.
326-83.
C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

Property at Issue

This appeal involves real property disputes. Accordingly, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
35(g), 1 the following map (the "Parcel Map") is provided to depict the lay of the land and the
location of the parcels of property at issue, located in the Homer Basin and Gray's Lake Outlet
area in Bingham County, Section 9, 10, 14, and 15, Township 2 South, Range 41 E.B.M.:

1

In furtherance of the purpose and intent of Rule 35(g), Respondents/Cross-Appellants have included an Addendum
to this brief which includes maps that were admitted into evidence at trial.

2
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Pis' Ex. 50. Parcel A-1 is public land owned by the State of Idaho and leased to Mr. Van Orden
pursuant to grazing lease No. G800084. R p. 368. Parcel A-2 is public land owned by the State of
Idaho and leased to Jay Van Orden pursuant to grazing lease G800052. R p. 368. Parcel B and
Parcel Dare private lands that were purchased by Mr. Radford from the Estate of Ted Thompson
and Shirley Thompson in January 2017. R pp. 368-69. Parcel C is private land owned by Ms.
Georgelean Olvera and leased to Mr. Radford. R pp. 368-69. Parcel E is private land owned by

3
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Foster Land and Cattle a/k/a Brockman Ranch. R pp. 183,185,207. Parcel Fis private land owned
by Seven J. and leased to Mr. Van Orden. R pp. 368-69.
Parcels A-1, B, and C are located within an enclosed "unit" known as the Homer Basin
(outlined in blue in the map below). Parcels A-2, D, E, and Fare located within an enclosed "unit"
known as the Outlet Ridge (outlined in green in the map below).

Pis. Ex. 57.
An unpaved two-track trail-highlighted in orange on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 50 and the Parcel
Map above-starts on Parcel A-1 and continues thereafter through the Homer Basin then turns
south through the Outlet Ridge to the Brockman Ranch property (Parcel E) (the "Orange Road").

4
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R pp. 368-69. The State of Idaho holds a reciprocal easement over only a portion of the Orange
Road (the "State Easement")-the State Easement does not cross Parcels C, E, or F. Pis.' Ex. 55.

2.

Mr. Van Orden Bulldozes Private Property.

In the fall of 2016, Mr. Van Orden trespassed onto Parcel B with a bulldozer and cut a
roadway onto a hillside next to the Gray's Lake Outlet. R. pp. 110.

Pis.' Ex. 29; R. pp. 111; 332-34. There was no dispute at trial that Mr. Van Orden caused the
damage at issue-Mr. Van Orden admitted to cutting the hillside with his bulldozer. Tr p. 748, L.
7-9; p. 771, L. 4-6. Further, Mr. Van Orden testified that he was not leasing the property that was
damaged when the damage occurred. Tr p. 842, L. 17-23. The damage occurred after Mr. Van
Orden descended into the Gray's Lake Outlet on adjacent State-owned property (Parcel A-2). Tr

5
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p. 843, L. 25-p. 844; L. 25. The descent was very steep, and Mr. Van Orden testified that he was
not able to exit the Outlet via the same way he came down because he was afraid the bulldozer
would tip. Tr p. 845, L. 1-6. Instead, Mr. Van Orden escaped the Outlet by cutting the roadway on
the adjacent private property. Tr p. 845, L. 1-15. Mr. Van Orden testified that he did not plan in
advance on cutting the roadway in question, but that it "just happened". Tr p. 772, L. 3-17.
3.

Mr. Van Orden Cuts Fences and Intentionally Drives Cattle onto Mr.
Radford's Property.

After Mr. Radford purchased Parcels B and D (and began leasing Parcel C), he observed
that fences separating his property from Mr. Van Orden's leased properties were being cut and
gates to Mr. Radford's property were left open. Tr p. 169, L. 9-22. Mr. Radford consulted with the
State about the issue and began locking gates. Tr p. 170, L. 6-p. 171; L. 12. Mr. Radford was
aware of the State Easement and made sure the State had its own lock and key for every gate along
the State Easement. Tr p. 170, L. 6-p. 171, L. 12. Indeed, the State testified that it had provided
Mr. Radford with the number oflocks needed to secure the State's access along the State Easement.
Tr p. 633, L. 23-p. 634, L. 6.
As the State's lessee, Mr. Van Orden could have used the State Easement and knew the
State had a key to the gate locks. R p. 342. However, Mr. Van Orden refused to be inconvenienced
by carrying a key ring in his pocket. R p. 342. Instead, Mr. Van Orden admitted to entering Mr.
Radford's private property without permission by way of forceful self-help. 2 R p. 343. This

2

Mr. Van Orden attempted to justify his actions by claiming he had a prescriptive easement over
the Orange Road, a claim that the district court rejected at trial. R pp. 368-70. Mr. Van Orden did
not appeal his prescriptive easement claim.
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forceful self-help included cutting fence lines and placing salt licks on Mr. Radford's private
property to attract cattle onto Mr. Radford's property. R p. 343; 350.
Mr. Van Orden further violated Mr. Radford's private property rights by placing more
cattle in the Homer Basin than the State land could support, forcing the cattle to seek forage on
Radford's adjoining lands. Mr. Van Orden's grazing lease with the State demonstrates that the
carrying capacity for the State properties within the Homer Basin is 245 AUMs. 3 Defs.' Ex. lB,
Attach. B; Tr p. 160, L. 2-13. Mr. Van Orden's grazing lease further required him to keep records
"showing the numbers and class of livestock [in the Homer Basin] and the dates put on and
removed [from the Homer Basin]." Defs.' Ex. lB, § 5.5. Mr. Van Orden admitted that he failed to
keep such records. Tr p. 754, L. 12-p.755, L. 3. Mr. Radford observed an aggregate total of
approximately 1000 AUMs in the Homer Basin in 2017. R p. 264; Tr p. 146, L. 6-p.147, L. 21; p.
162, L. 19-23; p. 161, L. 6-13. Mr. Matt Thompson testified at trial that he observed between 1100
and 1500 AUMs in the Homer Basin in 2017. R p. 264; Tr p. 405, L. 3-p. 408, L. 25. Finally, Mr.
Van Orden confirmed that hundreds of his cattle were in the Homer Basin beginning in late May
and continuing through the summer and fall of 2017. R p. 265; Tr p. 822, L. 18-p. 823, L. 10; p.
881, L. 14-p. 882, L. 14; p. 883, L. 23-p. 887, L. 8.

3

The term "AUM" is an acronym for animal units per month-the amount of forage or the carrying
capacity of the land. Tr p. 157, L. 18-p. 158, L. 5. For example, 250 animal units (a single bull or
a cow with a calf) would consume 1000 AUMs over a four-month period. Tr p. 45, L. 6-13.
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4.

Mr. Radford Constructs Partition Fences Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 35-103.

Mr. Radford's property in the Outlet Ridge (Parcel D) is adjacent to private property owned
by Seven J. (Parcel F). When Mr. Radford purchased the property in the Outlet Ridge, it became
necessary to construct partition fences pursuant to Idaho Code§ 35-103 in order to separate Mr.
Van Orden's cattle operation from Mr. Radford's property. R pp. 366-67. The Outlet Ridge is a
designated pasture enclosed by a fence. R p. 364.
Mr. Radford first sent the fencing notice required by§ 35-103 to Seven J. in April of 2017.
Tr p. 319, L. 25-p. 321, L. 3. In June of 2017, Mr. Radford constructed his required one-half share
of the partition fencing along the shared property boundary with Seven J. Pis' Ex. 57; R p. 365.
Mr. Radford paid $5,000 to construct this portion of partition fencing. R p. 365. In October of
2017, counsel for Mr. Radford again gave notice to Seven J. of the need to construct partition
fencing. Pis' Ex. 57; R p. 364. In June of 2018, well after the statutory six-month period had
expired, Mr. Radford proceeded to complete the rest of the partition fencing along the shared
property boundary with Seven J. R p. 365. Mr. Radford paid $5,505 to construct this portion of the
partition fencing. Pis' Ex. 91A; R p. 366.
Mr. Radford also fenced other boundary lines, including a fence along the shared boundary
between Mr. Radford's Parcel D and Foster Land and Cattle's Parcel E. R p. 459. This shared
fence was constructed in consultation with Foster Land and Cattle. As the State Easement did not
extend across Parcel E, a pole fence was constructed along this shared boundary (Parcel D and
Parcel E) without a gate. R p. 459.

8
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
Radford raises the following additional issues on cross-appeal:
Did the district court err in refusing to award damages for trespass and trespass of cattle
based on the value of the grass and foliage Van Orden's cattle consumed on the Radford property?
Did the district court err in ordering a gate to be installed against the wishes of the adjoining
property owners, against the ruling of the other district court, and without joining the affected nonparty?
In addition to the above issues, Radford seeks attorneys' fees on appeal against Seven J. as
set forth below.
Finally, Radford disputes the Issues on Appeal provided in Appellants' Brief. Specifically,
the fourth Issue on Appeal included in Appellants' Brief asks "Whether the trial court erred in
awarding damages for a fence that was paid in part by Radford Cattle, LLC." Appellants' Br. p. 9.
However, Appellants failed to raise this issue at any time before the district court and did not
include this issue in their Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal. "This Court will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150
Idaho 790,812,252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011); see also Parsons v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho
743, 746 152 P.3d 614, 617 (2007) (declining to hear issue of whether plaintiff had submitted an
adequate proof ofloss when defendant did not raise the issue before the trial court).

ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 41 and 54, Radford requests attorneys' fees on
appeal against Seven J. under Idaho Code§ 12-120(1).

9
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Idaho Appellate Rule 41 sets forth the procedure for obtaining an award of attorneys' fees
on appeal. First, "[ a]ny party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue
presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party." Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a). In
its decision on appeal, the Supreme Court shall include its determination of a claimed right to
attorneys' fees, "but such ruling will not contain the amount of attorney fees allowed." Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 (c). Rather, if the Supreme Court determines that a party is entitled to attorneys'
fees on appeal, "the party claiming attorney fees shall file a claim concurrently with, or as part of,
the memorandum of costs provided for by Rule 40." Idaho Appellate Rule 41(d).
Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) provides for attorneys' fees in all types of civil actions as long as
the amount pleaded does not exceed $35,000. In accordance with the express terms of§ 12-120(1),
a court must award attorneys' fees when the following conditions are met:
First, a plaintiff must provide a written demand for payment to defendant at least ten days
before the lawsuit is commenced. This demand letter must include the sum of money demanded.
KeybankNat'l Ass'n v. PALL LLC, 155 Idaho 287,297,311 P.3d 299,309 (2013). A defendant

may avoid paying attorneys' fees if such defendant tenders to plaintiff 95% of the amount
ultimately awarded at trial prior to the commencement of the action. Id. In accordance with this
requirement, on July 2, 2018, counsel for Mr. Radford provided written demand for payment to
Seven J. R pp. 391-93. This demand letter requested payment for Seven J. 's portion of the partition
fence costs within ten ( 10) days of the date of demand, and explicitly stated the sum of money
demanded--$5,505. R p. 391. The demand letter also warned Seven J. that "[a]ny attorneys' fees
and costs incurred to collect this amount going forward will also be requested from the Courts." R

10
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p. 391. Seven J. did not tender any part of the requested payment to Mr. Radford and Radford
proceeded to file a Complaint against Seven J. on August 2, 2018.
Second, a plaintiff must actually plead $35,000 or less in damages. Med. Recovery Servs.,
LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 336 P.3d 802, 809, 157 Idaho 395, 402 (2014).

The Complaint against Seven J. alleged a single cause of action-violation of Idaho's fencing
statute§ 35-103-and specifically pied for damages in the amount of $5,505 as a result of Seven
J.'s violation of§ 35-103. Aug. pp. 73-79.
Finally, a plaintiff must be the prevailing party at trial. Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr.,
158 Idaho 957, 969, 354 P.3d 1172, 1184 (2015). Radford prevailed at trial on the single cause of
action against Seven J. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court concluded
that "[b ]ased on the evidence adduced at trial, Radford shall have and recover from Seven J.
$5,000.00 for the partition fence he erected on Seven J.'s behalf along the southernmost border of
Radford's Outlet Ridge Property." R pp. 367-68. On Mr. Van Orden's motion for reconsideration,
the district court again found that it was "clear that Radford prevailed in his claim against Seven
J. and as to Seven J. 's claim against him [for prescriptive easement]." R p. 440.
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) applies both at trial and on appeal. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho
212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008) ("This Court has held that I.C. § 12-120 mandates an award
of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial."). Thus, if this Court affirms
the district court's judgment requiring Seven J. to pay its one-half cost of the partition fence
pursuant to Idaho Code § 35-103, the Court must also grant Radford attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in defending the issues appealed by Seven J.

11
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ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Notably, each of the issues raised by Mr. Van Orden and Seven J. (other than appealing
the attorneys' fee award) pertains to the factual findings in the district court's comprehensive 55page findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Appellants' Br. p. 10. "A district court's findings of
fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143
Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). Instead, "[o]n appeal this court examines the record to see
if challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. In addition,
"this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999). "Likewise, the trial
court's findings and conclusions which are based on substantial although conflicting evidence will
not be disturbed on appeal." Id.
"Attorney fees are a discretionary matter for the trial court and are reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,
769, 86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004).
This Court exercises "free review" over questions of law. Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,
555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 1989).
B.

ISSUES RAISED BY VAN ORDEN AND SEVEN J.

The issues raised by Mr. Van Orden and Seven J. can be grouped into four categories. First,
did the district court correctly conclude that Mr. Radford had standing to bring a claim for property
damage against Mr. Van Orden? Second, did the district court correctly award damages to Mr.

12
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Radford for the property damage caused by Mr. Van Orden? Third, did the district court correctly
require Seven J. to pay for one-half the cost of a partition fence pursuant to Idaho Code§ 35-103?
Finally, did the district court correctly award Mr. Radford with attorneys' fees against Seven J.
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1 )? As set forth in greater detail below, the answer to each of
these questions is yes.
1.

The District Court correctly concluded that Mr. Radford had standing to
bring a property damage claim against Mr. Van Orden.

The district court determined that Radford had standing to pursue the trespass claims for
the road Van Orden constructed on Radford's property because the claims were lawfully assigned
to him by the prior owner-the Thompsons. Aug. p. 21-24. Van Orden argues that the court erred
for two reasons: first, a claim of trespass is non-assignable in Idaho; and, second, the Thompsons
were not damaged by his trespass and accordingly had no claim to assign to Radford. Neither
argument has merit. And even if Van Orden's argument had merit, the district court's
determination must be upheld on the alternative ground that Van Orden's construction of a road is
a continuing trespass.

a.

Claims of Trespass Are Assignable in Idaho

Idaho Code§ 55-402 provides that "[a] thing in action arising out of the violation of a right
of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner." As a claim for trespass is
one that arises out of a violation of a right of property, Section 55-402 renders such a claim
transferable. This conclusion is supported by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Idaho Gold Dredging

Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co. (Idaho Gold I), 52 Idaho 766, 22 P.2d 147, 148 (1933); Idaho
Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Fayette Lumber Co. (Idaho Gold II), 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407,
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409 ( 1934). 4 Although the Idaho Gold cases deal with a nuisance claim rather than a trespass claim,
there is no reason to treat the two types of claim differently. Both trespass and nuisance are actions
arising out of the violation of a right of property-specifically the property right of use and
enjoyment for a nuisance claim and the property right to exclusive possession for a trespass claim.
Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541, 96 P.3d 637, 642 (2004) ("Idaho case law

has defined 'trespass' to apply to the wrongful interference with the right of exclusive possession
of real property, while the tort of private 'nuisance' applies to the wrongful interference with the
use and enjoyment ofreal property.").
Van Orden baselessly claims that Section 55-402 does not apply here because "there was
no 'thing in action.'" Appellants' Br. p. 14. Van Orden appears to believe that the statute permits
a property owner to transfer the right to sue only after the property owner actually brings the suit.
Id. (arguing no thing of action exists because "[ t]he Thompsons never filed a lawsuit or a claim

against Jay Van Orden"). This suggestion is contrary to the Idaho Gold cases and is entirely
impractical.
The Idaho Gold cases tacitly support the district court's conclusion that a claim for trespass
is assignable even before it has been asserted in a lawsuit. In Idaho Gold I, the Court noted the

4

Van Orden claims that Section 55-402 does not apply to causes of actions related to real property
because "Chapter 4 of Title 55 deals specifically with personal property and not with rights
regarding real property." Appellant's Br. at 13. This argument fails to grasp that "a thing in action"
is personal property, even when the action is based on damage to real property. And the
assignability of that personal property right (the "thing in action") is what is discussed in Section
55-402 and is at issue in Van Orden' s standing argument. The Court in Idaho Gold understood this
distinction, and accordingly relied on Section 55-402 in concluding that choses in action related to
the violation of real property rights are assignable.
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following procedural background: "Gold Dredging & Power Corporation assigned to appellant its
cause of action arising out of the damage to the mining ground, and appellant, on June 25, 1929,
filed a complaint against respondent to recover damages caused by the grease and oil." 22 P.2d at
148. And in Idaho Gold II, the Court upheld the claims as assignable, taking no issue with the fact
that the nuisance claim was assigned before any legal action was taken. 37 P .2d at 409 ("The thing
in action in this case arises out of an alleged violation of a right of property, and, under the section
of the Code above quoted, is assignable."). Thus, the Court implicitly ruled that a Section 55-402
claim was assignable before a lawsuit was initiated on the claim. And the Court later explicitly
affirmed that principle. McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291-92 (1973)
("[ A ]n assignee of a valid assignment is the real party in interest to bring an action." (emphasis
added)).
That conclusion is consistent with the principal of judicial economy. Under Van Orden's
theory, the property owner would be required to file a lawsuit, then assign the cause of action, and
then file an amended complaint and potentially a motion for substitution of real party in interest.
See ICRP 17. The extra step of substituting the assignee into the lawsuit would accomplish nothing

other than to waste time and money. And Van Orden has cited no legal authority requiring this
unnecessary procedure.
Van Orden next argues that the Idaho Gold cases do not apply because "they were clearly
overturned by the Mueller case." Specifically, Van Orden points to the following language in
Mueller: "[O]ne having no legal title to real estate, either in whole, or a reversionary interest

therein, cannot be damaged by the destruction of buildings or trees, or any of the appurtenances
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thereon or thereunto belonging, because he has no interest in the land." Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho
208, 215, 345 P.3d 998, 1005 (2015). But Mueller is inapposite.
Mueller did not involve an assignment of a claim or even an attempted assignment of a
claim. See generally, id. Without an assignment, there is no doubt an individual could not bring a
trespass claim related to property the individual has no interest in-which is all that Mueller
declares. But Mueller does not say that such a claim could not be transferred and then brought by
the assignee.
In fact, only two years prior to Mueller, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly endorsed
Section 55-402: "Assignment of property-related claims is also expressly permitted by LC. § 55402, which provides that ' [a] thing in action arising out of the violation of a right of property, or
out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.'" St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg 'l Med. Ctr.
v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41,293 P.3d 661,665 (2013). Consequently, there is no reason to believe
that the Court implicitly overturned its prior decisions, especially where the issue of assignability
was not before the Court in Mueller.
b.

The Thompsons were Damaged by Van Orden 's Trespass

Van Orden next argues that the Thompsons did not validly assign their trespass action
because they did not suffer any damages from the trespass and thus had no valid claim to assign.
Appellants' Br. pp. 12-13. Van Orden tries to find a safe harbor in the fact that his trespassing road
was not discovered until after the underlying property had been sold, claiming that because "[t]he
purchase price of the property sold to Radford was not affected because of Van Orden's conduct,"
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the Thompsons were not damaged by his trespass. See Appellants' Br. pp. 12-13. This argument
also fails.
Whether Van Orden's trespass altered the sale price of the Thompson property has no
bearing on whether the Thompsons were damaged by the trespass. As previously noted, "Idaho
case law has defined 'trespass' to apply to the wrongful interference with the right of exclusive
possession of real property." Moon, 140 Idaho at 541, 96 P.3d at 642. Because of that, the mere
act of trespass allows a claimant to sue for damages, even if there was no evidence of actual
damages. See Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 64, 349 P.2d 556, 560 (1960) ("Nominal damage
need not be proved, but naturally flows from a wrongful entry."); Nelson v. Holdaway Land &
Cattle Co., 107 Idaho 550, 553, 691 P.2d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 1984) (awarding nominal damages

to owner for trespass "even though no actual damages were proven"). In other words, the
Thompsons had an assignable trespass claim against Van Orden because Van Orden violated their
right of exclusive possession while they still owned the property.
Additionally, the Court should reject Van Orden's theory as a matter of policy, as his theory
would absolve a trespasser from liability so long as the trespass was undiscovered until after the
property was sold. Under Van Orden's theory, if the price was not altered because no one knew of
the trespass, the seller would have no right to sue. Nor would the buyer have a right to sue because
she did not own the property at the time of the trespass. That simply cannot be the law. A trespasser
cannot avoid liability simply because the property was sold before the trespass was discovered.
The Court should accordingly uphold the assignment of the Thompsons' trespass claim, as their
property was damaged by Van Orden's trespass.
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c.

Van Orden 's Construction of the Road is a Continuing Trespass

If the Court nevertheless determines that the assignment was ineffective, it must still rule
that Radford had standing under the alternative theory that Van Orden's unauthorized dozing of
the hillside to create a road on Radford's property is a continuing trespass. See Hauser Lake Rod

& Gun Club, Inc. v. City of Hauser, 162 Idaho 260, 264, 396 P.3d 689, 673 (2017) (appellate
courts "uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it"
(citation omitted)).
Idaho recognizes the common-law doctrine of continuing trespass, under which "[a]n
actor's failure to remove a thing tortuously placed on the land constitutes a continuing trespass for
the entire time during which it is on the land." Mueller, 158 Idaho at 214,345 P.3d at 1004 (quoting
75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass§ 40 (2007)). The Restatement (2d) of Torts explains that an "actor's failure
to remove from land in the possession of another a structure, chattel, or other thing which he has
tortuously erected or placed on the land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time during

which the thing is wrongfully on the land." § 161 (b) (emphasis added). The Restatement further
notes that the rule of continuing trespass "is of particular importance where there has been a
transfer of the possession of the land or of the ownership of the thing ... subsequent to the actor's
placing of the thing on the land."§ 161(e). In such circumstances, "the transferee of the land may
maintain an action for its continuance there." Id. 5

5

Other secondary sources and caselaw from other jurisdictions agree with the Restatement.
See, e.g., Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr., 239 N.C. App. 301, 303-305 (reviewing and
accepting the rule of continuing trespass as set forth in the American Jurisprudence and Corpus
Juris Secundum treatises); Betterview Invs., LLC v. Pub. Serv. Co., 198 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Co.
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The Restatement also provides that a continuing trespass arises from the unauthorized
construction or placement of a "structure, chattel, or other thing." Restatement (2d) of Torts, §
161(b). Idaho law classifies a roadway as a "structure." Indeed, this Court has previously cited
with approval Webster's Dictionary's definition of structure-"something [that is] constructed or
built ... [including] any building, highway, road, railroad, excavation, or other structure." Hap
Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 614, 338 P.3d 1204, 1218

(2014) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'! Dictionary ofEnglish Language 2267 (Philip Babcock
Gove et al. eds., G & C. Merriam Co. 1971)) (emphasis added). This Court also noted that, for
purposes ofldaho's mechanics lien statute, wagon roads are considered structures. Id. ("[I]fwagon
roads are structures, then surely paved roadways and cart paths are also structures for purposes of
section 45.501.").
Consequently, Van Orden' s dozing to create an unauthorized roadway on the Radford
property constitutes a continuing trespass. And Radford has standing to pursue a claim for trespass,
regardless of whether the Thompsons' assignment was lawful.

Ct. App. 2008) (holding that landowner had standing to bring trespass claim under continuing
trespass theory); Rosenthal v. City of Crystal Lake, 525 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
("If a trespass is continuing, any person in possession of the land at any time during its continuance
may maintain an action for trespass."); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 29 (2007) ("[I]f a possessory
interest in land has been transferred after the actor placed something on the land that constitutes a
continuing trespass, a transferee of the land may maintain an action for continuing trespass
there."); 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 26 (2010) ("If a trespass is continuing, any person in possession of
the land at any time during its continuance may maintain an action for trespass.").
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2.

The District Court correctly awarded damages to Radford for property
damage.

The district court awarded Mr. Radford $72,175 for the property damages caused by Mr.
Van Orden's bulldozer incident. R p. 340. After thoroughly reviewing the expert report and
testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness-Mr. Patrick Naylor-the district court concluded "[b ]ased
on Mr. Naylor's expertise and experience, and his detailed compilation of materials, labor, and
projected time calculations, his final cost estimates for restoring Radford's Property to its natural
condition prior to Van Orden's road cut are reasonable and with[in] an acceptable range of
certainty." R p. 340.
Mr. Van Orden argues that Mr. Naylor's expert report and testimony were not reasonably
certain. In addition, Mr. Van Orden disputes the damages awarded by the district court by
continuing to push factual theories rejected by the district court.
a.

Mr. Naylor 's Damages Estimate was Within an Acceptable Range of
Reasonable Certainty.

Damages must be proved with "reasonable certainty." See Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v.
Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 10, 415 P.2d 48, 52 (1966). However, the "reasonable certainty" standard

is somewhat of a misnomer. Indeed, this standard does not require damages to be proved with
"mathematical exactness," but instead "simply means that the existence of damages must be taken
out of the realm of speculation." Id.; see also Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100
Idaho 175, 182-83, 595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979) ("Damages need be proved only with a reasonable
certainty and courts have determined this simply means that existence of damages must be taken
out of the realm of speculation."). "Certainly, a party who has [caused the damages] will not
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ordinarily be permitted to escape liability because of the difficulty or uncertainty of proving the
damages which have resulted." Id.
Mr. Naylor's expert report was admitted into evidence by the district court. Pis' Ex. 22.
This expert report includes a thorough cost opinion which contains detailed costs for three remedial
"tasks" (repair of slope, weed control, and monitoring) and eleven associated activities. Pis' Ex.
22 pp. 42-45. The estimated costs of these three tasks and eleven associated activities was $76,175.
Pis' Ex. 22 p. 46. The expert report also included a 30% contingency totaling $22,853, bringing
the total cost estimate to $99,028. Pis' Ex. 22 p. 46. At trial, Mr. Naylor explained in detail each
activity listed in the estimated cost report and his basis for the estimated rates and costs associated
with each such activity. Tr p. 482, L. 4-p. 494, L. 11.
After reviewing Mr. Naylor's expert report and his detailed testimony at trial, the district
court concluded that he "was a credible witness for the damages caused by Van Orden' s bulldozing
of Radford's Property." R p. 339. The district court further concluded that Mr. Naylor's
"evaluation and his estimation of the time, materials, and costs necessary to remediate the damage
to Radford's Property were logical and well-reasoned." R p. 339. However, demonstrating its
familiarity with the "reasonably certain" standard, the district court determined Mr. Naylor's
contingency factor was "too speculative" and did not include the amount of such contingency
factor in the damages award to Mr. Radford. R p. 340. In addition, the district court refused to
award damages for amounts associated with topographical and vegetative survey activities listed
as "optional" in Mr. Naylor's expert report. R p. 340. After excluding damages based on the
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contingency and the optional activities, the district court awarded Mr. Radford with damages in
the amount of $72,175. R p. 340.
Mr. Van Orden contends that Mr. Naylor's estimation of damages was not "reasonably
certain". This contention was the basis of a motion to strike expert testimony raised by counsel for
Mr. Van Orden at trial. In essence, this objection was caused by the disconnect between the legal
meaning of the phrase "reasonably certain" and the common usage of such term. 6 Indeed, Mr.
Naylor explained that he was unaware that the term "reasonably certain" had some legal
connotation and that the answers he provided in response to questions as to whether he was certain
of the costs of repair were not provided within the context of any such legal definition or otherwise
intended to draw any legal conclusions. Tr p. 525, L. 4-8. Moreover, the district court took the
issue under advisement and, after reviewing Mr. Naylor's thorough expert report and detailed
witness testimony, concluded that "[b]ased upon Mr. Naylor's expertise and experience, and his
detailed compilation of materials, labor, and projected time calculations, his final cost estimates
for restoring Radford's Property to its natural condition prior to Van Orden's road cut are
reasonable and with[in] an acceptable range of reasonable certainty." R p. 340.
b.

The District Court Correctly Rejected Mr. Van Orden 's Remaining
Arguments.

6

The common understanding of the word "certain" is different than the legal standard for
"reasonably certain." For example, the term "certain" is defined as "known or proved to be true:
indisputable" (Meriam Webster's online dictionary), "free from doubt or reservation"
(dictionary.com), and "ascertained, precise, identified, definitive, clearly known, or unambiguous"
(Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed.). Indeed, each of these definitions requires a much higher
threshold than simply removing from "the realm of speculation." Anderson & Nafziger, 100 Idaho
at 182-83, 595 P.2d at 716-17.
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Mr. Van Orden attempts to raise a number of additional factual issues to dispute the district
court's award of property damages. First, Mr. Van Orden repeatedly claims that there was a preexisting roadway on the hillside in question. This claim was rejected by the district court after
weighing the evidence. R p. 333 ("Prior to May of 2017, no road existed (other than a cow trail).").
The district court's finding was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Indeed, other
than Mr. Van Orden's own testimony, Mr. Van Orden failed to offer any evidence or witnesses in
support of his claim. 7 In contrast, Mr. Radford offered evidence and witness testimony
demonstrating that there was not a previously existing trail or roadway on the hillside. Mr. Radford
testified that he visited and inspected the property in question on three different occasions in June
of 2016 and that the hillside was all grass or sagebrush with no trail or roadway. Tr p. 99, L. 18-p.
101, L. 13; p. 107, L. 12-15; p. 110, L. 2-5; p. 214, L. 13-20. Mr. Matt Thompson testified that he
had previously visited the area in questions hundreds of times and confirmed that there was no
road on the hillside prior to Mr. Van Orden's bulldozer incident. Tr p. 401, L. 21-p. 402, L. 16.
Finally, Mr. Naylor observed that the diagonal road cut along the hillside did not appear to have
been performed on a previously existing road. Pis. Ex. 22, p. 4. Mr. Naylor based this conclusion
on the fresh disturbance of soil, along with the absence of evidence of a previously existing road
at the bottom of the hillside cut. Pis. Ex. 22, p. 4.

7

Mr. Van Orden's own testimony contradicts his claim that he was merely widening a pre-existing
roadway on the hillside. Mr. Van Orden testified at trial that he cut out the hillside because he was
"sick of carrying posts down there on his back," directly implying that he was not previously able
to drive down to the area in question on an ATV or pickup truck. Tr p. 772, L. 9-17.
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Second, Mr. Van Orden attempts to minimize the amount of damages by comparing the
damage to Mr. Radford's property to the damage Mr. Van Orden caused to the adjacent State
property. Again, this comparison was rejected by the district court. R pp. 338-39. The district
court's finding was based on substantial and competent evidence. The damages caused by Mr. Van
Orden to the two properties are very different. At trial, Mr. Van Orden explained that he went
down a hillside on the State's property into the Outlet. Tr p. 843, L. 25-p. 844, L. 25. The hillside
was steep causing Mr. Van Orden to drop the bulldozer's blade, presumably to slow his descent.
Tr p. 843, L. 25-p. 844, L. 25. Unlike the damage to Mr. Radford's property, Mr. Van Orden did
not cut a new roadway on the State's property. Indeed, Mr. Van Orden testified that he was unable
to exit the outlet along the same path he came in. Tr p. 845, L. 1-6. Mr. Heath Hancock testified
that Mr. Van Orden's bulldozer removed vegetation in a couple of locations on the State's
property, but that the cut was not significant enough to require additional topsoil to remediate. Tr
p. 590, L. 13-p. 591, L. 1. Mr. Naylor also observed that the pathway down the hillside slope on
the State's property had clearly been disturbed by heavy equipment coming down the slope, but
that the displacement of soil was small. Pis.' Ex. 22, p. 3. In contrast, the damage to Mr. Radford's
property is an uphill cut that is approximately 200 feet long, 8 to 10 feet wide, and six inches to 2
feet deep. Pis.' Ex. 22, p. 3.
Finally, Mr. Van Orden attempts to discredit the expert report by comparing it with a
preliminary report prepared by Mr. Naylor's company. Once again, the district court considered
and rejected this argument and its conclusion was based on substantial and competent evidence. R
p. 340. Mr. Naylor testified that the preliminary report was developed by a biologist in his office
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and was based solely on the revegetation component. Tr p. 499, L. 1-11. As the district court
correctly recognized, "[ m Jere revegetation would not have put the site back to its natural
condition" and "Mr. Naylor used the numbers in the preliminary report as a starting point for his
final estimate." R p. 340.

3.

The District Court correctly required Seven J. to pay for one-half of a partition
fence under Idaho Code § 35-103.

Idaho's fencing statute provides for the construction of partition fences as follows:
ERECTION OF PARTITION FENCES. When two or more persons
own land adjoining which is enclosed by one (1) fence, and it
becomes necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of
one ( 1) party that a partition fence be made between them, the other
or others, when notified, must proceed to erect, or cause to be
erected, one-half (1/2) of such partition fence; said fence to be
erected on, or as near as practicable to, the line of said land. And if,
after notice given in writing, either party fails to erect and complete,
within six (6) months time thereafter, one-half (1/2) of such fence,
the party giving the notice may proceed to erect the entire partition
fence and collect by law one-half the costs of such fence from the
other party, and he has a lien upon the land thus partitioned.
Idaho Code § 35-103. After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the district court concluded
that Mr. Radford was entitled to recover from Seven J. one-half the cost of the partition fence
pursuant to§ 35-103. R p. 367-68.
Seven J. does not dispute the district court's interpretation and legal conclusions regarding
§ 35-103. Instead, Seven J. disputes certain factual issues. First, Seven J. claims there was no
evidence that Mr. Radford's property and Seven J. 's property were enclosed by a fence.
Appellants' Br. pp. 19-20. Second, Seven J. argues that it had not received proper notice pursuant
to § 35-103. Appellants' Br. pp. 21-22. Finally, Seven J. claims that Radford Cattle had no right
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to require Seven J. to reimburse it for the costs incurred in constructing the partition fence.
Appellants' Br. p. 20.
Where Seven J. challenges factual findings of the district court on appeal, the question for
this Court to consider is whether the evidence supports the factual findings of the district court. "A
district court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Ransom,
143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. Instead, "[o]n appeal this court examines the record to see if
challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. In addition,
"this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered." Rowley, 133 Idaho at 107, 982 P.2d at 942 (1999).
a.

Mr. Radford and Seven J. 's Properties Were Enclosed by a Fence.

The district court correctly noted that "[a] prerequisite for the application of Idaho Code
§ 35-103 is that the adjoining parcels of land be enclosed by one fence." R p. 366. The district
court then determined that "[t]he maps admitted into evidence show an existing fence enclosing
the Outlet Ridge Unit, which includes most of Seven J.'s property, all of Radford's Outlet Ridge
Unit Property, and three parcels of state-owned lease lands." R p. 366.
Substantial and competent evidence supports the district court's factual finding that the
properties in question were enclosed by a fence as required by§ 35-103. As noted by the district
court, the maps that were admitted into evidence clearly show that the Outlet Ridge Unit was an
enclosed pasture and surrounded by a fence. For example, Plaintiffs' exhibits 46 and 57 clearly
show the Outlet Ridge designated as a "pasture" and a fence outlined in green surrounding the
pasture. Pis.' Exs. 46, 57. Moreover, several witnesses discussed the term "pastures" during the
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trial as it related to the Homer Basin Unit and Outlet Ridge Unit. Mr. Matt Thompson testified that
he was familiar with the Outlet Ridge Unit and that its boundaries consisted of "some fences that
have been there for before my time." Tr p. 374, L. 22-23. Mr. Heath Hancock explained that
pastures were enclosures that, whether by fence or natural boundary, can be grazed. Tr p. 571, L.
7-25. Mr. Pat Brown also confirmed that the intent of pastures is that they should be an enclosure
based on reasonable management practices. Tr p. 936, L. 20-p. 937, L. 04. Even Mr. Van Orden
referred to the Outlet Ridge Unit and the Seven J. property as a "pasture." Tr p. 831, L. 10-12; p.
886, L. 9-11.
Thus, despite Seven J. 's assertions to the contrary, the district court made the correct factual
finding that the properties in question were enclosed by a fence. This factual finding was not
clearly erroneous, but was instead supported by substantial and competent evidence, including
maps admitted into evidence and trial testimony from witnesses.
b.

Mr. Radford Provided Notice to Seven J. as Required by Section 35-103.

The district court concluded that "Seven J. received notice of Radford's intent to erect a
partition fence in the Outlet Ridge Unit on October 17, 2017." R p. 367. The district court reviewed
§ 35-103 and concluded that "[t]he other party's duty to build a portion of the partition fence begins
with notice by the requesting party" and "[ s]ix months from the notice date, if the other party has
not erected its portion of the fence, the requesting party may build the other party's portion of the
fence and seek costs from the other party." R p. 367. The district court then made the factual
finding that "[b]y June of 2018, more than six months after Seven J. received notice of Radford's
intent to construct a partition fence in the Outlet Ridge Unit, Seven J. had not begun construction
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on a fence between Radford's southern boundary and Seven J.'s property" and that Mr. Radford
then proceeded "to erect the portion of the partition fence which should have been constructed by
Seven J." R p. 367.
Again, the district court's factual finding is supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Mr. Radford testified that he first sent a fencing notice to Seven J. in April of 2017. Tr
p. 319, L. 25-p. 321, L. 3. Due to the unknown entity status of Seven J., Mr. Radford sent the
notice to a Christiansen sibling along with Mr. Van Orden. Tr p. 320, L. 14-16. On October 17,
2017, counsel for Mr. Radford sent another fencing notice to Seven J. Pis.' Ex. 53. This letter
provided Seven J. with a "Renewed Six-Month Notice to Lessee", again confirming that Mr.
Radford intended to fence the boundary line between his property and Seven J. 's property pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 35-103. Pis.' Ex. 53, p. 7.
c.

Seven J. is Otherwise Required to Pay its One-Half Share of the Partition
Fence.

In a final attempt to relieve itself of the statutory obligation to pay its one-half share of the
partition fence, Seven J. raises a new issue on appeal. Seven J. claims that Radford Cattle incurred
a portion of the cost of constructing the partition fence and, without citation to any legal authority,
that the district court should not have awarded any damages for the costs incurred and paid for by
Radford Cattle.
Seven J. has clearly waived this issue on appeal. "This Court will not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal." Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 150 Idaho at 812, 252 P.3d at 93 (2011);
see also Parsons, 143 Idaho at 746, 152 P.3d at 617 (declining to hear issue of whether plaintiff
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had submitted an adequate proof of loss when defendant did not raise the issue before the trial
court). At no point below did Seven J. raise an issue with an invoice for fence construction being
made out to Radford Cattle as opposed to Mr. Radford individually. Seven J. does not raise this
issue anywhere in its closing argument brief. Moreover, Seven J. doesn't raise this issue in its
Notice of Appeal or Amended Notice of Appeal. Seven J. did not raise this issue at all until its first
brief on appeal. Again, Idaho caselaw on this point is clear-"The longstanding rule of this Court
is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row v. State, 135
Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001).
In any event, Seven J. 's claims are without merit. At trial, Mr. Radford testified that he
hired Rockin T Excavation to clear the fence line and Mark Stosich, Inc. to construct the fence. Tr
p. 200, L. 24-p. 201, L. 01. Mr. Radford then confirmed that he paid the invoices for the work
conducted by Rockin T and Mark Stosich. Tr p. 201, L. 07-08. Moreover, Mr. Radford testified as
to the relationship between himself and the Radford Cattle entity. 8 Radford Cattle is owned 50
percent by Mr. Radford and 50 percent by Intermountain Paper Company. Tr p. 182, L. 11-14. Mr.
Radford owns 100 percent oflntermountain Paper. Trp. 184, L. 3-9; p. 185, L. 9-13. Accordingly,
the profits, losses, expenses, etc. of Radford Cattle all flow through and funnel back to Mr.

8

Mr. Radford's testimony regarding the Radford Cattle corporate structure arose in the context of
Mr. Radford's claim for Tortious Interference with Economic Opportunity. Mr. Radford was
unable to put his cattle on his Homer Basin and Outlet Ridge properties because Mr. Van Orden
continued to cut fence lines. R p. 361. Mr. Radford instead pastured his cattle in Idaho Falls and
spent $23,084.44 on the necessary hay to feed his herd. Mr. Van Orden argued that Mr. Radford
should not be able to recover this amount because the feed was paid for by Intermountain Paper
Company, Inc., as evidenced by checks written by Intermountain Paper and admitted into
evidence. Pis. Ex. 44. This issue regarding feed costs has not been appealed by either party.
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Radford. Tr p. 184, L 2-13. Again however, Mr. Radford confirmed that he paid the invoices for
the fence construction and Seven J. never raised this issue before the district court.

4.

The District Court correctly awarded attorneys' fees against Seven J.

Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) provides for attorneys' fees in civil actions as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any
action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars
($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing
party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be
fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded
attorney's fees, for the prosecution of the action, written demand for
the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant
not less than ten ( 10) days before the commencement of the action;
provided, that no attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if
the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to
the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to ninetyfive percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff.
If its requirements are met, § 12-120(1) "mandate[s] an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Cox v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho 356, 359, 128 P.3d 893,
896 (2005). A court must then determine the reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award based on
the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Sun Valley Potato

Growers, Inc., 139 Idaho at 769, 86 P.3d at 483.
The district court (1) determined that Mr. Radford's request for attorneys' fees met the
conditions of§ 12-120(1 ), (2) found that Radford prevailed on the claim against Seven J., and (3)
awarded Mr. Radford $29,115.25 in attorneys' fees and $1,220.72 in costs after conducting a
thorough reasonableness analysis under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. R pp. 440456.
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Seven J. did not question Mr. Radford's satisfaction of the requirements for an award of
attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(1). R p. 440. Instead, Seven J. raised only two
objections to the award of attorneys' fees, which have been repeated nearly verbatim on appeal.
First, Seven J. disputes whether Radford was the prevailing party. Second, Seven J. assails the
reasonableness of the fees requested by and awarded to Mr. Radford.
a.

Mr. Radford was the Prevailing Party Against Seven J.

Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the method by which a trial court
is to determine who is the "prevailing party":
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties. The trial court may determine that
a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the
parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment
or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B).
The prevailing party determination is within the "sound discretion of the district court and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC,
152 Idaho 540, 542, 272 P.3d 512, 514 (2012). When examining whether a district court abused
its discretion, the Supreme Court considers whether the district court ( 1) perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently within the
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Jorgenson v.
Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536,538,224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). "Only in the rarest of circumstances
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will [the Supreme Court] reverse the district court's determination of which party prevailed."

Oakes, 152 Idaho at 543, 272 P.3d at 515 (emphasis added).
The district court correctly perceived the prevailing party issue as one of discretion. R pp.
433-34. The district court then acted consistently within applicable legal standards and the
boundaries of its discretion in concluding that "it is clear that Radford prevailed in his claim against
Seven J. and as to Seven J. 's claim against him [for prescriptive easement]." R p. 440.
On appeal, Seven J. raises three arguments in support of its contention that Mr. Radford
was not the prevailing party. First, Seven J. claims that Mr. Radford cannot be the prevailing party
because the district court did not grant a motion in limine requesting clarification as to Seven J. 's
corporate form. 9 Appellants' Br. p. 23. However, the district court properly weighed this issue in
its prevailing party analysis and, acting within its discretion and by an exercise of reason,
determined that the issue carried little weight in the prevailing party determination "since the
request was made in the course of litigation and was not part of Radford's claim for relief in his
pleading against Seven J." R p. 440. This district court's decision was further supported by an
analysis of the actual claims raised in the pleadings-Mr. Radford's claim for fencing costs under

9

By way ofbackground, Seven J. forfeited its corporate status as of 1993, but continues to operate
a cattle business on its property through its agent, Mr. Van Orden. R p. 284. Mr. Radford argued
that Seven J. is a general partnership pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-23-202(a). In its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court agreed with this analysis. The district court
concluded that "Van Orden acts as agent for Seven J., with the knowledge and consent of the
sibling partners." R p. 365. The district court further explained that Van Orden "acts as the agent
for what is now the Seven J. partnership". R p. 366. In any event, the district court properly acted
within its discretion and by an exercise of reason in determining that the issue carried little weight
in the prevailing party determination "since the request was made in the course of litigation and
was not part of Radford's claim for relief in his pleading against Seven J." R p. 440.
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§ 35-103 and Seven J. 's counterclaim for prescriptive easement. R pp. 440-456. "In considering
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties"
the district court correctly noted that Mr. Radford "clear[ly]" prevailed on both of these claims. R
p. 440.
Second, Seven J. argues that Mr. Radford is not the prevailing party because he was only
awarded $5,000 by the district court instead of the entire $5,505 requested in the Complaint against
Seven J. However, an analysis of the amounts involved or requested compared against the results
obtained is not part of the prevailing party analysis, but is instead considered by the district court
as part of its reasonableness analysis under Rule 54(e). See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G). In conducting
this reasonableness analysis, the district court correctly acknowledged that "Radford sought
payment for one-half of the cost of the fence he erected between his and Seven J.'s properties in
the Outlet Ridge Unit" and that Mr. Radford "prevailed on his claim, as well as on his defense of
Seven J.'s prescriptive easement counterclaim." R p. 454.
b.

The District Court's Award of Costs and Fees was Reasonable.

"The reasonableness of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's consideration of
the factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc., 139 Idaho at 769, 86 P.3d at
483. "The factors of Rule 54(e)(3) include time and labor; difficulty; skill required; prevailing
charges; fixed or contingent fee; time limitations; amount and result; undesirability of the case;
relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; costs of automated research; and any other
factors." Id. "Although a trial court is not required to make 'specific findings demonstrating how
it employed any of the factors in Rule 54(e)(3),' it is required to consider those factors when
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determining the amount of the fees to award." Id. (quoting Perkins v. U.S. Transformer W., 132
Idaho 427, 430, 974 P.2d 73, 76 (1999)). "The bottom line in an award of attorney fees is
reasonableness." Lettunich, 145 Idaho at 750, 185 P.3d at 262.
"Attorney fees are a discretionary matter for the trial court and are reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc., 139 Idaho at 769, 86 P.3d at 483. "The
burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion." Lettunich, 145 Idaho at 749, 185 P.3d at 261. To determine whether the district court
abused its discretion, the Supreme Court considers whether the district court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it, and whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Parsons, 143 Idaho at
747, 152 P.3d at 618; Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 911, 120 P.3d 289,299 (Ct. App. 2005).
The district court understood that the award of attorneys' fees was a discretionary decision.
R p. 440 ("A reasonableness analysis, subject to this Court's discretion, shall be undertaken
below."). The district court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with
proper legal standards, including a thorough review of each Rule 54(e)(3) factor. R pp. 453-55.
Finally, the district court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Indeed, in its Order granting
fees, the district court spent over fifteen pages conducting its reasonableness analysis. R pp. 44156. Not only did the district court review each of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors as required, but it also
responded to each and every one of Seven J. 's specific objections to the time entries provided by
Mr. Radford, including time entries as small as 0.3 hours. R pp. 441-52. In doing so, the district
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court cut certain time entries and fee requests that it found to be excessive. R pp. 441, 448. A
review of the district court's order granting fees shows that the court carefully considered each
time entry that was challenged. Cf Lettunich 145 Idaho at 750, 185 P.3d at 262 (upholding an
award of attorneys' fees where "it was obvious that the court carefully considered each entry that
was challenged").
On appeal, Seven J. has not shown any abuse of discretion by the district court in its award
of attorneys' fees to Radford. Instead, Seven J. asks this Court to repeat the reasonableness analysis
that the district court has already conducted and that is reserved to the discretion of the district
court. Appellants' Br. p. 25 ("When the fees charged by Respondents and awarded by the trial
court are considered in detail, it is clear that the fees that were awarded are not reasonable.").
Indeed, Seven J. has simply repeated its "reasonableness" arguments and specific objections from
its memorandum in support of motion to disallow costs in the Appellants' Brief.
This Court does not conduct a de novo reasonableness review on appeal, but instead
determines whether the district court abused its discretion. Seven J. has not carried its burden of
demonstrating that any such abuse of discretion occurred. Indeed, Seven J. 's portion of the
Appellants' Brief discussing the district court's award of attorneys' fees fails to include a single
citation to any legal authority, much less a legal authority supporting the contention that the district
court abused its discretion. This is perhaps understandable, as there is no legal authority in Idaho
supporting the contention that a district court abuses its discretion when it awards attorneys' fees
to a prevailing party after thoroughly and carefully reviewing the required Rule 54(e)(3) factors
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and specifically considering and responding to each specific objection raised by the non-prevailing
party.
C.

ISSUES RAISED ON CROSS-APPEAL

The cross-appeal filed by Radford raises two issues of law. First, did the district court err
in the legal standard for an award of damages for trespass of cattle? Second, did the district court
err in the legal standard for ordering a gate to be installed at the end of the State Easement? As set
forth below, the answers to both of these questions is yes.
1.

The District Court erred by failing to award unjust enrichment damages for
Van Orden's trespass.

At trial, the district court correctly determined that "Van Orden willfully and intentionally
allowed his cattle to trespass on to Radford's Property by placing salt licks which would knowingly
guide the cattle on to Radford's Property." R p. 353. But the court erroneously determined that
"Radford has not proved damages resulted from Van Orden' s trespass by cattle" because according
to "the credible testimony ofIDL Resource Supervisor Heath Hancock, the Homer Basin Unit was
not over-grazed in 2017." R p. 354.
In relying on Heath Hancock's testimony, the Court misunderstood Radford's claim.
Hancock, and apparently the Court, determined there were no trespass damages because of the
state of the grass in the Homer Basin. This was a mistake.
Radford argued that Van Orden had intentionally placed more cattle in the Homer Basin
than his lease allowed. R p. 264; Tr p. 146, L. 6-p.147, L. 21; p. 162, L. 19-23; p. 161, L. 6-13.
The interior boundary lines between the State and private properties in the Homer Basin Unit are
unfenced. Van Orden's lease of Parcel A-1 entitles him to utilize 245 AUMs in the Homer Basin
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for the entire year. Defs.' Ex. lB, Attach. B; Tr p. 160, L. 2-13 Radford owns and leases Parcels
Band C in the Homer Basin and, because Radford did not want to mix his cattle with Van Orden's
cattle, Radford did not place cattle in the Homer Basin in 201 7. Van Orden took advantage of this
situation. He argued that because Idaho is a fence out state, his cows are allowed to naturally travel
throughout the Homer Basin seeking forage on any of the unfenced Parcels within the Homer
Basin. This much is true. However, Radford proved at trial that Van Orden willfully and
intentionally drove his cattle onto Radford's property, both by (1) cutting fences and placing salt
licks on Radford's property; and (2) placing excess cattle in the Homer Basin to have his cattle
graze over 1000 A UMs in the Homer Basin. While Idaho is a fence-out state, Van Orden is not
entitled to place more cattle in the Homer Basin than he has grass available to him. 10
This deliberate driving and excess placement of cows in the Homer Basin was the cause of
the damages Radford sought during trial. Radford successfully demonstrated that Van Orden was
unjustly enriched by overgrazing the Homer Basin, namely profiting from the unauthorized
consumption of Radford's grass, and Radford is entitled to damages based on that consumption
and Van Orden's unjust enrichment. R pp. 265-67. Put differently, Van Orden stole Radford's

10

Idaho is an "open range" state and cattle are generally permitted to roam freely. See Idaho Code
§ 25-2118. However, there are a number of exceptions to the open range policy. First, "[t]he legal
fence laws of the State of Idaho provide a remedy to the landowner whose property, although
enclosed by a legal fence, is nonetheless damaged by roaming cattle." See Maguire v. Yanke, 99
Idaho 829, 833, 590 P.2d 85, 89 (1978). Second, cattle are not "lawfully at large" under Idaho's
open range statute if they were willfully and intentionally allowed to trespass. Id. at 832, 88.
"Willful or intentional trespass of livestock can take the form of a deliberate driving of the
livestock upon the lands of another . . . [or] it may result from an invasion by the livestock
following overstocking of adjacent grazing land." Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 419, 745 P.2d
294,298 (1987); see also Legg v. Baringa, 92 Idaho 225,440 P.2d 345 (1968).
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grass by intentionally placing, driving, and enticing his cattle to consume at least 750 extra AUMs
in the Homer Basin (i.e., Radford's grass), without Radford's approval and without compensating
Radford for the amount of unjust enrichment he received.
Accordingly, Radford asked the district court for damages in the amount that Van Orden
was unjustly enriched by benefitting from Radford's grass. R pp. 265-67. And, contrary to the
district court's conclusion, Radford never argued that the grass in the Homer Basin had been
"overgrazed" under Heath Hancock's definition, as the height and health of the grass in the Homer
Basin is irrelevant to Radford's claims.
Radford's theory of damages is supported by both case law and statute. See Miller, 113
Idaho at 419, 745 P.2d at 298; Idaho Code § 36-1110. In Miller, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled
that a cattle rancher was liable for damages based on a "[w]illful or intentional trespass of
livestock." Id. The damages granted to the adjacent property holder for that trespass-and affirmed
by the Idaho Supreme Court-was based on the amount of crop ruined by the trespass, the amount
of"planted hay consumed or trampled by [the] cattle," and reasonable "compensation for pasturage
of [the] cattle." Id. at 416 (emphasis added). That is precisely what Radford seeks in this case-to
be awarded damages based on the amount of grass that was consumed by Van Orden's cattle.
The Idaho legislature has separately affirmed that the unauthorized consumption of grass
on private lands justifies damages for the "loss of forage." See Idaho Code § 36-1110. Although
governing wildlife, rather than animals owned by other private citizens, Section 1110 establishes
that the consumption of grass by an unauthorized animal constitutes a "depredation." Id. at§ 3611 l0(a). Consequently, Section 1110 does not require that the trespassed property be "overgrazed"
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(at least in the sense that a specific area of grass becomes ungrazable) before the property owner
can bring a claim for damages. It requires only that the grass is "damaged or destroyed or consumed
by grazing wildlife." Id. (emphasis added). And the claims for damages under the statute "shall be
limited to loss of forage on private lands." Id. at § 36-11 l0(b) (emphasis added). Again, that is
exactly the type of damages Radford seeks here, as he seeks to be reimbursed for the forage Van
Orden stole from his private property. Such damages seem even more appropriate when the loss
of forage results from an intentional trespass of cattle, rather than from wildlife randomly entering
and grazing on private property.
Nevertheless, the district court failed to consider Radford's theory of damages, instead
erroneously deferring to Hancock's statements that the Homer Basin was not "overgrazed."
Significantly, Hancock used the term "overgrazed" differently than Radford used it in his
arguments-testifying only that no specific portion of the State-owned land in the Homer Basin
was "overgrazed." Tr p. 618, L. 12-22 (Answering "no" to "did you see that Mr. Van Orden was
overgrazing any portion of the Basin area?" (emphasis added)); Tr p. 629, L. 7-14 (testifying that
the Department never determined "that any area had been overgrazed); Tr p. 624, L. 4-10
(testifying that his focus is ensuring that "we have good grazing management and the conditions
are - that we have good range land conditions"); Tr p. 656, L. 5-13 (testifying that when
investigating the grass, he focused only on the State-owned portion of the Homer Basin, not the
entire Basin). In other words, Hancock's only concern was the state of the grass on the State-owned
land, not the amount of forage consumed by Van Orden's cattle or the available AUMs. He
expressly testified that he did not count cattle, but looked only at the quality of the grass. See Tr p.
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656, L.21-p. 658, L. 6. Consequently, in testifying that he observed no "overgrazing" in the Homer
Basin, Hancock was not expressing an opinion on whether Van Orden grazed more of the Homer
Basin than he was entitled under the Leases-which was the only relevant issue under Radford's
claim.
On the relevant issue, Hancock's testimony actually supports Radford's claim. Hancock
testified that, though it varies from year to year, there is a baseline of approximately 250 AUMs
available for grazing in the State-owned portion of the Homer Basin each year. Tr p. 649, L. 1-15.
That means there was enough grass available to feed approximately 50 cow/calf pairs for five
months (or 125 cow/calf pairs for two months, etc.) on State-owned land. Tr p. 649, L. 1-24. But
Van Orden placed far more than 50 cattle in the Homer Basin each month for more than five
months. In fact, Van Orden placed roughly 200 cows in the Homer Basin every month for five
months-the equivalent of over 1000 AUMs, or four times the amount provided for in Van Orden' s
Leases. Compare Tr p. 404, L. 25-p. 408, L. 1 with Tr p. 756, L. 14-17; p. 800, L. 17-p. 804, L. 6.
So, Hancock's testimony that no portion of the Homer Basin Unit was "overgrazed,"(i.e. rendered
ungrazable), ultimately proves Radford's point. Van Orden introduced far more cows into the
Homer Basin than could have been supported by the land under his control. Had the cattle remained
only on the State property, the property would have been "overgrazed" as the term was used by
Hancock. See Tr p. 655, L. 22-p. 656, L. 13. But the grass on the State-owned land was not ruined,
because Van Orden intentionally utilized the A UMs properly belonging to Radford.
For these reasons, the district court erred in concluding that Radford has not proved
damages resulted from Van Orden's trespass by cattle. And the Court should remand the issue of
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damages back to the district court, to determine the value of the grass consumed by Van Orden's
cattle.

2.

The District Court erred by requiring a gate to be installed.

By way of reminder, Mr. Van Orden and Seven J. claimed a prescriptive easement over the
length of the "Orange Road". R p. 368. The Orange Road traverses several properties, including
property owned by Ms. Olvera (Parcel C) and property owned by Brockman Ranch (Parcel E). R
p. 368-71. In contrast, the State Easement does not cross the property owned by Ms. Olvera (Parcel
C) or the property owned by Brockman Ranch (Parcel E):

Prlvae::Klng
¥ 1lil'II

Pis. Ex. 14. The State Easement clearly terminates at the boundary line between Mr. Radford's
property (Parcel D) and the Brockman Ranch property (Parcel E).
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The district court denied Mr. Van Orden and Seven J.'s claims to a prescriptive easement.
R p. 371. Neither Mr. Van Orden nor Seven J. submitted any additional evidence during trial
showing any right to cross the Brockman Ranch property (Parcel E). The owners of the Brockman
Ranch property were not named as parties in either the Van Orden Litigation or the Seven J.
Litigation. R p. 872; L. 8-12.
In a separate lawsuit, Mark Radford and Radford Cattle, LLC v. State ofIdaho, Bonneville
County Case No. CV-2018-1601, the State of Idaho-as the actual holder and grantee under the
State Easement-brought an interference with easement claim against Radford that was identical
to the interference with easement claims brought by Mr. Van Orden and Seven J. Aug. p. 115-30.
The State argued that the pole fence constructed on the boundary between Mr. Radford's property
(Parcel D) and the Brockman Ranch property (Parcel E) precluded the State's use of the State
Easement. Aug. p. 120-22. Judge Joel Tingey denied the State's claim for interference with the
State Easement, holding that the State did not have a right to a gate at the southern border of
Radford's "D" property. Aug. p. 120-22 ("Absent some showing by the State as to how a fence at
the end of the easement interferes with its use, Radford is entitled to maintain the fence.").
Despite the fact that (1) the district court denied Mr. Van Orden's and Seven J.'s claim to
a prescriptive easement; (2) Brockman Ranch was not a party to either the Van Orden Litigation
or the Seven J. Litigation; and (3) Judge Tingey had already denied the State's claim for
interference with the State Easement, on a motion for reconsideration the district court ordered
"Radford shall construct a gate at the juncture of the 'orange' road and the 'pole' fence on the
southern border of Radford's Parcel D." R pp. 460-61. The order was based on the court's
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erroneous belief that without a gate, the fence would obstruct the State's easement for a road on
Radford's property. R pp. 460-61. Specifically, the court determined that "the obstruction bars the
State's access to Parcel D altogether." R p. 460. The court's decision was erroneous on two levels.
First, the factual determination that the fence bars the State from accessing Parcel D is not
supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the district court's own findings of fact demonstrate
that the State could access Parcel D from orange road coming from the west, even with an ungated
fence at the southern border of the easement. R pp. 368-69. The district court found that the State
Easement begins in State-owned property to the west and goes through Radford's property and
ends at the southern border of Radford's "D" Property. R pp. 368-69. The State already has access
to the entirety of the State Easement without requiring any access from the south and the State's
inability to access the State Easement from the south is not caused by Radford's fence. It is caused
by the fact that Radford's southern border abuts private property over which neither the State nor
Mr. Van Orden has a right to access. Even if Radford's fence had a gate, neither the State nor Mr.
Van Orden would have legal access to the State Easement from the south. To require Radford to
build a gate simply invites the State and Mr. Van Orden to trespass on the adjacent private property.
Second, the district court's decision erroneously provides Mr. Van Orden (as a lessee or
invitee of the State Easement) with more rights than the State (as the grantee and holder of the
State Easement). It is a fundamental principle of law that someone possessing a property interest
"cannot grant a greater interest in property than its own ... interest." Bedard & Musser v. City of
Boise City, 162 Idaho 688, 690, 403 P.3d 632, 634 (2017). Pursuant to Judge Tingey's order, the
State does not have a right to a gate at the southern boundary of the State Easement. Aug. p. 120-
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22. Accordingly, while the State as the easement holder has no right to a gate at the southern border
of Radford's "D" property, the district court's decision provides Mr. Van Orden-the mere lessee
of that easement-with the very right that was denied to the State. That violates the principle
articulated in Bedard, as the State could not grant Van Orden rights that it did not have-to force
Radford to build a gate at the southern boundary of the State Easement. 403 P.3d at 634.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the district court's conclusion that Mr. Radford
must build a gate at the southern border of the "D" property.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Radford respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district
court's 55-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and resulting Judgment as it relates to
the issues raised in Appellants' Brief. In addition, this Court should remand the issue of damages
resulting from Mr. Van Orden's trespass of cattle to the district court. Finally, this Court should
reverse the district court's order requiring Mr. Radford to construct a gate at the southern border
of his property.
DATED this 26th day of June, 2020.
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER

By:
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Isl Jon A. Stenquist
Jon A. Stenquist
Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho that,
on the date given below, (he/she) caused to be served a copy ofRespondents' and Cross-Appellants
Brief upon the following person(s) using Electronic Filing:
Gary Cooper
J.D. Obom
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229

DATED this 26th day of June, 2020.

Isl Jon A. Stenquist
Jon A. Stenquist
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Addendum to Respondents' and Cross-Appellants' Brief

A- Plaintiffs' Ex. 11
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